Research/Massachusetts Injury Law Glossary

Massachusetts Injury Law Glossary

Plain-language definitions of 147 terms a person may meet in a Massachusetts injury matter, from the injury itself to a verdict and an appeal. Each definition was written from the statute, court rule or court decision it comes from, and each links to that source.

Author: Atty. Daniel J. Larson

Sources read October 26, 2026

Published: October 26, 2026

About this glossary

147 terms in ten groups, each tied to a specific Massachusetts statute, court rule or appellate decision.
116 sources in all: 74 sections of the Massachusetts General Laws, 16 court rules and orders, and 26 decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court.
Every definition links to the official text it was written from: the Legislature’s page for a statute, the court’s page for a rule, or the published opinion for a decision.
Where a common name for a rule does not appear in the law itself (for example “attractive nuisance” or the “51 percent” rule), the definition says so.
Dollar limits and thresholds are described without their amounts. Some are changed by later orders, and the official pages should be checked for the current figure.
This is a reference to the law as written on October 26, 2026. It is not legal advice about any one situation.

How to read a source

G.L. c. 231, § 85: Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 231, section 85.
Mass. R. Civ. P. 56: Rule 56 of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, the court rules for civil lawsuits. “Mass. R. App. P.” means the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
S.J.C. Rule: a rule of the Supreme Judicial Court.
457 Mass. 368 (2010): a decision printed in volume 457 of the Massachusetts Reports, starting at page 368, decided in 2010.

How the glossary was made

The terms were chosen to cover what a person may meet in a Massachusetts injury matter: who is responsible, the deadlines and notices, the special rules for government, vehicles, property, dogs, products, work and medical care, claims after a death, and the stages of a court case.

Every statute was read on the Legislature’s website, every court rule on the court system’s pages, and every decision in its published opinion. A script checked that each definition’s supporting passage appears word for word in the saved source before the definition was used, and no term was defined from memory. The definitions restate the source in plain language; where the law uses a word differently from everyday speech, the definition follows the law.

Left out, and why:

Residential landlord and tenant terms and residential lead paint rules.
Criminal law terms, except where a civil statute relies on them.
Federal law, including federal benefit liens.
Dollar figures for caps, thresholds and fines. They are described in words instead.

Law as of

Statutes: the Massachusetts General Laws as shown on the Legislature’s website on October 26, 2026.
Court rules: the versions on the court system’s pages on October 26, 2026.
Decisions: the published opinions as decided. Later decisions may refine them.
Sources read October 26, 2026.

All terms, A to Z

AAccrual · Answer · Apology statements · Appeal deadline · Arbitration · Arising out of and in the course of employment · Assumption of risk

BBicycle helmet rule · Bicyclist rights on public ways · Breach of warranty (product injury) · Bystander emotional distress

CCase tracks (Superior Court time standards) · Chapter 258 (government liability) · Chapter 93A (unfair or deceptive practices) · Charitable immunity limit · Child trespassers (artificial conditions) · Claim for benefits; conciliation · Collateral source reduction (malpractice) · Collateral source rule · Comparative negligence · Complaint · Conference · Conscious suffering · Consumer protection deadline · Contingent fee

DDamages limit for public employers · Dangerous dog · Death from a defective way · Defective way · Demand letter (Chapter 93A) · Department of Industrial Accidents (DIA) · Deposition · Design defect · Discovery · Discovery rule · Discretionary function exception · Dog bite liability · Dram shop liability · Duty of care · Duty to carry workers’ compensation · Duty to lawful visitors · Duty to trespassers

EEmployee (workers’ compensation) · Exclusive remedy · Executor or administrator

FFailure-to-prevent-harm exception · Fair monetary value of the decedent · First report of injury · Fraudulent concealment

GGross negligence · Guest occupant

HHearing (workers’ compensation) · Hospital lien

IImpartial medical examiner · Implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose · Implied warranty of merchantability · Informed consent · Insurer repayment from a third-party recovery · Interrogatories

JJoint and several liability · Joint tortfeasors and contribution · Judgment · Jury trial

KKeeper (of a dog)

LLimit on pain and suffering (malpractice) · Loss of consortium (parent of an injured child) · Loss of consortium (spouse) · Lump sum settlement

MMediation · Medical assistance repayment · Medical malpractice deadline · Medical malpractice tribunal · Mental or emotional injury (workers’ compensation) · Minors and incapacitated persons (tolling) · Mode of operation · Motion to dismiss · Motor vehicle liability policy · Multiple damages (Chapter 93A)

NNegligence · Negligent infliction of emotional distress · Notice of a dangerous condition · Notice of injury on a public way · Notice of intent to sue (182-day notice)

OOpen and obvious danger · Opening a vehicle door into traffic

PPain and suffering threshold (motor vehicle cases) · Partial incapacity · Pedestrian (for PIP) · Permanent and total incapacity · Personal injury protection (PIP) · Persons entitled (who receives death damages) · Police protection exception · Post-judgment interest · Pre-arranged ride · Prejudgment interest · Presentment · Presumption of due care · Privity · Product defect · Product warranty deadline · Provider of health care · Proximate cause · Public employee · Public employee immunity · Public employer · Punitive damages (wrongful death)

RRecreational use statute · Registered owner’s responsibility (prima facie evidence) · Release; covenant not to sue · Request for production of documents · Res ipsa loquitur · Rideshare insurance · Rule 35 examination

SSafe passing distance (vulnerable users) · Sale to an intoxicated person · Serious and wilful misconduct · Serious bodily injury · Service deadline · Snow and ice (duty of property owners) · Snow and ice notice to property owners · Social host liability · Specific injury and disfigurement benefits · Spoliation of evidence · Stacking · Standard of care (medical) · State highway defects · Statute of limitations · Statute of repose (building and construction) · Summary judgment · Summons; service of process · Superior Court and District Court · Superseding cause · Survival of actions

Disclaimer: Statute of limitations rules can vary significantly by state, jurisdiction, and the specific type of claim. The information above is general in nature. Please consult a qualified attorney for advice specific to your situation.

TTemporary total incapacity · Third-party claim (work injury) · Tort exemption (personal injury protection) · Transportation network company (rideshare) · Tribunal bond

UUnderinsured motorist coverage · Uninsured motorist coverage

VVicarious liability (respondeat superior) · Violation of a statute (no negligence per se)

WWorkers’ compensation · Workers’ compensation claim deadline · Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund · Wrongful death · Wrongful death deadline

Fault and responsibility

How Massachusetts law decides who is responsible for an injury and how responsibility is shared.

Assumption of risk

A defense to negligence claims that Massachusetts has abolished. The comparative negligence statute says so in one sentence. Source: G.L. c. 231, § 85

Comparative negligence

The rule that decides what happens when the injured person was also careless. Under the statute, the injured person’s own negligence does not bar recovery as long as it was “not greater than” the total negligence of the people being sued. The award is then reduced in proportion to the injured person’s share. The statute does not use a “51 percent” label; its test is “not greater than.” Source: G.L. c. 231, § 85

Duty of care

The legal obligation to act with reasonable care toward another person. Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the judge, and a precondition is that the risk of harm was recognizable or foreseeable. Source: Jupin v. Kask, 447 Mass. 141 (2006)

Gross negligence

Negligence substantially and appreciably greater than ordinary negligence: very great negligence, the absence of slight diligence, or the want of even scant care. Source: Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588 (1919)

Joint and several liability

When two or more wrongdoers negligently contribute to one person’s injury by acts that operate together, so that the harm cannot be separated, each is liable for the whole. They may then seek contribution from one another (see “Joint tortfeasors and contribution”). Source: O’Connor v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 401 Mass. 586 (1988)

Joint tortfeasors and contribution

When two or more people are legally responsible for the same injury, they are joint tortfeasors. One who pays more than a fair (pro rata) share of the common liability can recover the excess from the others. This right of contribution exists even if a judgment has not been entered against all of them. Source: G.L. c. 231B, § 1

Negligence

The failure to use the care that a person of ordinary caution and prudence would use in the circumstances. To win a negligence claim, the injured person must prove four things: the defendant owed a duty of reasonable care, the defendant breached that duty, damage resulted, and the breach caused the damage. Source: Jupin v. Kask, 447 Mass. 141 (2006); Altman v. Aronson, 231 Mass. 588 (1919)

Presumption of due care

In a negligence case the injured person is presumed to have been acting with due care. A defendant who says otherwise has to prove it. Source: G.L. c. 231, § 85

Proximate cause

The link between careless conduct and an injury that the law requires. The injured person must show the conduct was a cause in fact of the injury and also its proximate, or legal, cause, which depends on whether the injury was a foreseeable result of the conduct. Source: Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312 (2002)

Registered owner’s responsibility (prima facie evidence)

In a motor vehicle case, registration in the defendant’s name is prima facie evidence that the vehicle was being driven by someone the defendant was legally responsible for. A defendant who denies that responsibility must raise it in the answer and prove it, as an affirmative defense. Source: G.L. c. 231, § 85A

Release; covenant not to sue

A release or covenant not to sue given in good faith to one of two or more people liable for the same injury does not free the others unless its terms say so, but it reduces the claim against them by the amount stated or paid, whichever is greater. The settling party is freed from contribution claims by the others. Source: G.L. c. 231B, § 4

Res ipsa loquitur

A doctrine that lets a jury infer negligence when the accident is one that ordinarily does not happen without negligence and the cause was under the defendant’s control. The injured person does not have to rule out every other possible cause; the evidence must make it more probable than not that the defendant was negligent and that the negligence caused the injury. Source: Wilson v. Honeywell, Inc., 409 Mass. 803 (1991)

Superseding cause

An event between the careless conduct and the harm that breaks the chain of causation, so that the original conduct is no longer treated as a legal cause of the harm. Source: Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312 (2002)

Vicarious liability (respondeat superior)

An employer’s liability for an employee’s negligence. The injured person must show the person who caused the harm was the employer’s employee at the time and that the negligence happened within the scope of the employment. This applies to employers of physicians too, without proof that the employer could control specific treatment decisions. Source: Dias v. Brigham Medical Associates, Inc., 438 Mass. 317 (2002)

Violation of a statute (no negligence per se)

In Massachusetts, breaking a safety law does not by itself prove negligence; there is no “negligence per se.” The violation is only some evidence of negligence as to the harms the law was meant to prevent. Source: Bennett v. Eagle Brook Country Store, Inc., 408 Mass. 355 (1990)

Deadlines and notice

The time limits for bringing a claim, and the notices some claims require first.

Accrual

The point from which a limitation period is counted. The general statute runs the three years from when “the cause of action accrues” but does not define that moment; the courts do (see “Discovery rule”). Source: G.L. c. 260, § 2A

Appeal deadline

In a civil case, the notice of appeal is generally due within 30 days after the judgment is entered, or within 60 days if the Commonwealth or one of its officers or agencies is a party. Source: Mass. R. App. P. 4(a)

Consumer protection deadline

Claims under laws that protect consumers, including Chapter 93A, must be started within four years after the cause of action accrues. Source: G.L. c. 260, § 5A

Demand letter (Chapter 93A)

Before a consumer sues under Chapter 93A, section 9, a written demand for relief must be mailed or delivered to the business at least thirty days before filing. It must identify the claimant and reasonably describe the unfair or deceptive practice and the injury. Source: G.L. c. 93A, § 9

Discovery rule

The court-made rule for when an injury claim accrues. The clock starts when the injured person knew, or reasonably should have known, that they were harmed or may have been harmed by the defendant’s conduct, and knew or had sufficient notice of what caused the harm. Notice that the defendant breached a duty is not required. Source: Bowen v. Eli Lilly & Co., 408 Mass. 204 (1990)

Fraudulent concealment

If the person responsible fraudulently hides the claim from the injured person, the time before the injured person discovers it does not count against the deadline. Source: G.L. c. 260, § 12

Medical malpractice deadline

Claims for malpractice, error or mistake against physicians, surgeons, dentists, optometrists, hospitals and sanitoria must be started within three years after the cause of action accrues, and in no event more than seven years after the act or omission, except where a foreign object was left in the body. Source: G.L. c. 260, § 4

Minors and incapacitated persons (tolling)

If the person entitled to sue is a minor, or is incapacitated by mental illness, when the right to sue first accrues, the time limit runs from when that disability ends. The statute does not use the word “tolling.” Source: G.L. c. 260, § 7

Notice of injury on a public way

A person hurt by a defect in a road, sidewalk or bridge must give written notice within thirty days to whoever is responsible for keeping it in repair, stating who was injured and the time, place and cause. Suit must be started within three years. For injuries caused by snow or ice, a missing notice is a defense only if the defendant proves it was harmed (prejudiced) by the lack of notice. Source: G.L. c. 84, § 18

Presentment

The written claim that must be given to a public employer before suing it under Chapter 258. It goes to the employer’s executive officer within two years after the cause of action arose. If the officer does not deny the claim in writing within six months, it is treated as denied and suit may follow. The lawsuit itself must be started within three years. Source: G.L. c. 258, § 4

Product warranty deadline

An injury claim against a manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier for breach of warranty must be started within three years after the date the injury and damage occurs. Source: G.L. c. 106, § 2-318

Service deadline

After a lawsuit is filed, the summons and complaint must be served on each defendant within 90 days. Without good cause for the delay, the case is dismissed as to that defendant. Source: Mass. R. Civ. P. 4

Snow and ice notice to property owners

The same thirty-day notice rules apply to claims against people over snow or ice on their own premises or adjoining ways. A missing notice is a defense only if the owner proves it was prejudiced. Source: G.L. c. 84, § 21

Statute of limitations

The deadline for starting a lawsuit. In Massachusetts, injury (tort) cases and contract cases for personal injuries generally must be started within three years after the cause of action accrues. Other laws set different periods for some claims, several of which are listed in this glossary. Source: G.L. c. 260, § 2A

Statute of repose (building and construction)

A fixed outer time limit. Claims over a deficiency or neglect in the design, planning, construction or general administration of an improvement to real property cannot be started more than six years after the earlier of the opening of the improvement to use or its substantial completion and occupancy. This applies even though the general period for those claims runs three years from accrual. The statute does not use the term “repose.” Source: G.L. c. 260, § 2B

Claims against government, roads and charities

Special rules for claims against cities, towns, the Commonwealth and charities.

Chapter 258 (government liability)

The statute that lets people sue Massachusetts public employers for harm caused by employees’ negligence. Public employers are liable “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,” subject to the exceptions, limits and notice rules in the chapter. Source: G.L. c. 258, § 2

Charitable immunity limit

Being a charity is not a defense to an injury claim. But where the harm happened in an activity carried on to directly accomplish the charity’s purposes, the charity’s liability is limited to a set amount, with a higher set amount for malpractice claims against nonprofit health care organizations. The limit does not apply to activities that are primarily commercial. Source: G.L. c. 231, § 85K

Damages limit for public employers

Chapter 258 caps what a public employer pays on a claim at a set amount, and bars interest before judgment and punitive damages. Claims for serious bodily injury against the MBTA are not subject to that limit on compensatory damages. Source: G.L. c. 258, § 2

Defective way

A defect, lack of repair or lack of a sufficient railing in a public way. A person injured by one may recover from the county, city, town or person obliged to repair it if the defect could have been prevented by reasonable care and they had, or could have had, reasonable notice of it. The statute caps the amount at a set limit. Source: G.L. c. 84, § 15

Discretionary function exception

Chapter 258 does not apply to a claim based on a public employer’s or employee’s exercise of, or failure to exercise, a discretionary function or duty, even if the discretion was abused. Source: G.L. c. 258, § 10

Failure-to-prevent-harm exception

Chapter 258 generally does not apply to a claim that a public employer failed to prevent or reduce harm from a condition or situation it did not originally cause, including another person’s violent or wrongful conduct. The statute lists exceptions to this exception; one keeps claims for negligent maintenance of public property. Source: G.L. c. 258, § 10

Police protection exception

Chapter 258 does not apply to claims for failing to provide adequate police protection, prevent crimes, or investigate, detect or solve crimes. It does still cover, among other things, negligent operation of motor vehicles and the negligent protection, supervision or care of people in custody. Source: G.L. c. 258, § 10

Public employee

An elected or appointed officer or employee of a public employer, whether full or part time, temporary or permanent, paid or unpaid. Source: G.L. c. 258, § 1

Public employee immunity

Under Chapter 258 the claim runs against the public employer. The individual public employee is not personally liable for negligence while acting within the scope of the job. Source: G.L. c. 258, § 2

Public employer

Under Chapter 258, the Commonwealth and any county, city, town, educational collaborative or district, along with the public bodies the statute lists. It does not include a private contractor working for one of them, the Massachusetts Port Authority, or other independent public corporations. Source: G.L. c. 258, § 1

Serious bodily injury

In Chapter 258, bodily injury that results in permanent disfigurement, loss or impairment of a bodily function, limb or organ, or death. Source: G.L. c. 258, § 1

State highway defects

The Commonwealth is liable for injuries caused by defects within the constructed traveled roadway of a state highway, on conditions that follow the town-road rules, and up to a set limit. Source: G.L. c. 81, § 18

Cars, bicycles and rideshare

Auto insurance, no-fault benefits and the rules of the road that matter after a crash.

Bicycle helmet rule

Riders and passengers aged 16 or younger must wear a helmet on a public way or path. Not wearing one may not be used as evidence of contributory negligence in a civil case. Source: G.L. c. 85, § 11B

Bicyclist rights on public ways

People riding bicycles may use all public ways except limited-access or express highways posted against bicycles, and are subject to the traffic laws. A driver who causes a crash with a bicycle cannot defend on the ground that the bicycle was to the right of traffic. Source: G.L. c. 85, § 11B; G.L. c. 90, § 14

Guest occupant

For insurance purposes, a person in, entering or leaving a vehicle other than an employee of the owner or driver. Paying passengers in taxicabs and other vehicles for hire are excluded. Source: G.L. c. 90, § 34A

Motor vehicle liability policy

The liability insurance in a Massachusetts auto policy. It protects the insured and anyone driving with permission against liability to pay damages to others for bodily injuries, up to minimum amounts the statute sets. Source: G.L. c. 90, § 34A

Opening a vehicle door into traffic

No one may open a door unless it is reasonably safe to do so without interfering with other traffic, including bicyclists and pedestrians. Source: G.L. c. 90, § 14

Pain and suffering threshold (motor vehicle cases)

In an injury case arising from a motor vehicle accident, damages for pain and suffering can be recovered only if the reasonable and necessary medical expenses exceed a set amount, or the injury causes death, the loss of a body member, permanent and serious disfigurement, one of the specific losses listed in section 36 of the workers’ compensation statute, or a fracture. Source: G.L. c. 231, § 6D

Pedestrian (for PIP)

For personal injury protection, “pedestrian” includes people riding bicycles, tricycles and similar vehicles. Source: G.L. c. 90, § 34A

Personal injury protection (PIP)

Benefits every Massachusetts auto policy must include. It pays reasonable expenses for medical care received within two years of the accident, lost wages up to 75 percent of the average weekly wage for the year before the accident, and certain replacement services, up to a set amount per person, without regard to who was at fault. It covers the named insured, household members, authorized drivers and passengers, and pedestrians struck by the vehicle, with exclusions the statute lists. Source: G.L. c. 90, § 34A; G.L. c. 90, § 34M

Pre-arranged ride

The period that begins when a rideshare driver accepts a requested ride through the digital network, continues while the rider is carried, and ends when the rider safely leaves the vehicle. Source: G.L. c. 159A½, § 1

Rideshare insurance

A rideshare company and its drivers must carry insurance set by statute. It applies at one level while a driver is logged on and waiting for a ride, and at a much higher level during a pre-arranged ride. If the driver’s coverage lapses or is denied, the company’s policy must cover the claim from the start. Personal auto policies may exclude rideshare periods. Source: G.L. c. 159A½, § 5; G.L. c. 175, § 228

Safe passing distance (vulnerable users)

When passing a vulnerable user, such as a bicyclist or pedestrian, a driver must pass at a safe distance of at least 4 feet and at a reasonable and proper speed. Source: G.L. c. 90, § 14

Stacking

Adding together the uninsured motorist limits of two or more vehicles or policies. Massachusetts law says the limits may not be added together. Source: G.L. c. 175, § 113L

Tort exemption (personal injury protection)

Because personal injury protection pays regardless of fault, the owner and driver of an insured vehicle are exempt from suit for bodily injury to the extent the injured person is paid, or entitled to be paid, those benefits. Source: G.L. c. 90, § 34M

Transportation network company (rideshare)

The statute’s term for a ride service that uses a digital network, meaning an online application, software, website or system, to connect riders to drivers to pre-arrange and provide transportation. Source: G.L. c. 159A½, § 1

Underinsured motorist coverage

Optional coverage that applies when the at-fault driver’s liability limit is less than the injured person’s uninsured motorist limit and is not enough to cover the damages. Source: G.L. c. 175, § 113L

Uninsured motorist coverage

Required coverage in every Massachusetts auto policy that protects the people it insures when they are injured by an uninsured vehicle or a hit-and-run driver and are legally entitled to damages from that owner or driver. Source: G.L. c. 175, § 113L

Property and premises

Injuries on land and in buildings: visitors, trespassers, snow and ice, and alcohol service.

Child trespassers (artificial conditions)

A person who keeps an artificial condition on land is liable for physical harm to trespassing children when every one of the statute’s conditions is met, including that the children, because of their youth, do not discover the condition or realize the risk. The statute does not use the name “attractive nuisance.” Source: G.L. c. 231, § 85Q

Dram shop liability

The liability of a tavern keeper for serving alcohol to an intoxicated patron. A tavern keeper has a duty to refuse to serve only if it knows or reasonably should have known the patron is intoxicated. The liability rests on ordinary negligence, not directly on the liquor statute. Source: Cimino v. Milford Keg, Inc., 385 Mass. 323 (1982)

Duty to lawful visitors

A property owner or occupier owes every lawful visitor the same duty of reasonable care, including keeping the property in reasonably safe condition in view of all the circumstances. Massachusetts no longer divides visitors into “licensees” and “invitees” for this purpose. Source: Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693 (1973)

Duty to trespassers

The traditional Massachusetts rule is that a person with control over land owes an adult trespasser no more than to refrain from wilful, wanton or reckless disregard for the trespasser’s safety. Trespassing children are covered by a separate statute (see “Child trespassers”). Source: Schofield v. Merrill, 386 Mass. 244 (1982)

Mode of operation

A rule for self-service businesses. If a reasonably foreseeable unsafe condition results from the owner’s self-service business or mode of operation, and a person slips because of it, the notice requirement is satisfied without proof of how long the hazard was there. Source: Sheehan v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc., 448 Mass. 780 (2007)

Notice of a dangerous condition

In most premises cases the injured person must show the owner knew of the hazard (actual notice) or that it had been there long enough that, with reasonable care, the owner should have found it and removed it or warned of it (constructive notice). How long is enough depends on the circumstances. Source: Deagle v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 343 Mass. 263 (1961); Sheehan v. Roche Bros. Supermarkets, Inc., 448 Mass. 780 (2007)

Open and obvious danger

A property owner ordinarily has no duty to warn lawful visitors of dangers that would be obvious to a person of average intelligence. That relieves the owner of the duty to warn, but not always of the duty to fix the danger: an owner may still have to remedy an obvious danger it created and kept while knowing visitors would encounter it anyway. Source: O’Sullivan v. Shaw, 431 Mass. 201 (2000); Dos Santos v. Coleta, 465 Mass. 148 (2013)

Recreational use statute

A person who lets the public use land for recreation or similar purposes without charging a fee is not liable for injuries to those users, including minors, unless the landowner’s conduct was wilful, wanton or reckless. The protection does not apply to anyone who charges a fee; a voluntary contribution is not a fee. Source: G.L. c. 21, § 17C

Sale to an intoxicated person

Massachusetts law forbids licensed premises from selling or delivering alcohol to an intoxicated person. The statute is a prohibition only; it says nothing about lawsuits. Liability of the seller comes from court decisions (see “Dram shop liability”). Source: G.L. c. 138, § 69

Snow and ice (duty of property owners)

Property owners owe lawful visitors the same duty of reasonable care about snow and ice as about any other hazard. The court abolished the old difference between “natural” and “unnatural” accumulations. What is reasonable depends on expected foot traffic, the size of the risk, and the burden and expense of removal. Source: Papadopoulos v. Target Corporation, 457 Mass. 368 (2010)

A social host may be liable to a person injured by a guest’s negligent driving while intoxicated, if the host knew or should have known the guest was drunk and still served the guest or let the guest take a drink. Source: McGuiggan v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 398 Mass. 152 (1986)

Dogs and products

Liability for dog bites and for goods that cause injury.

Breach of warranty (product injury)

In Massachusetts, liability for breach of the warranty of merchantability is governed by G.L. c. 106, §§ 2-314 to 2-318, which the Supreme Judicial Court has said are congruent in all material respects with the principles in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. A defendant can breach that warranty without having been negligent. Source: Colter v. Barber-Greene Co., 403 Mass. 50 (1988)

Dangerous dog

A legal classification for a dog that, without justification, attacks a person or domestic animal causing physical injury or death, or that behaves in a way a reasonable person would believe poses an unjustified imminent threat. Source: G.L. c. 140, § 136A

Design defect

Whether a product’s design is defective is decided by weighing its risks against its usefulness (a risk-utility test). What consumers expect is one factor among many, not the whole test. Source: Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 465 Mass. 411 (2013)

Dog bite liability

If a dog injures a person or damages property, the dog’s owner or keeper is liable, or a parent or guardian if the owner or keeper is a minor. The statute does not require proof of negligence or of an earlier bite. It does not apply if the injured person was trespassing, committing another wrong, or teasing, tormenting or abusing the dog. A child under seven is presumed not to have been doing any of those things. Source: G.L. c. 140, § 155

Implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose

A warranty implied by law when, at the time of the sale, the seller has reason to know the particular purpose the buyer needs the goods for and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to choose suitable goods. Source: G.L. c. 106, § 2-315

Implied warranty of merchantability

A warranty implied by law whenever a merchant sells goods of the kind it deals in: that the goods are merchantable, which includes being fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. Source: G.L. c. 106, § 2-314

Keeper (of a dog)

A person, business or other entity, other than the owner, that has possession of a dog. Source: G.L. c. 140, § 136A

Privity

In Massachusetts, lack of privity is no defense to a claim against a manufacturer, seller, lessor or supplier of goods for breach of warranty or negligence, even though the injured person did not buy the goods from that defendant, as long as the injured person was someone the defendant might reasonably have expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods. Source: G.L. c. 106, § 2-318

Product defect

A product may be defective and unreasonably dangerous in three ways: a manufacturing defect, a design defect, or a warning defect, meaning a failure reasonably to warn of foreseeable risks. Source: Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 465 Mass. 411 (2013)

Injuries at work

The workers’ compensation system and claims against others after a work injury.

Arising out of and in the course of employment

The test for whether a work injury is covered by workers’ compensation. It also covers an ordinary risk of the street while the employee is actually engaged, with the employer’s authorization, in the employer’s business. Source: G.L. c. 152, § 26

Claim for benefits; conciliation

A workers’ compensation claim is filed with the state and the insurer on the state’s form. The case first goes to the state’s conciliation unit, which may try to resolve it by informal means. Source: G.L. c. 152, § 10

Conference

The first proceeding before a workers’ compensation administrative judge, held within twenty-eight days after the case reaches the dispute resolution division. A party unhappy with the judge’s order has fourteen days to appeal for a hearing. Source: G.L. c. 152, § 10A

Department of Industrial Accidents (DIA)

The state department, under a director of industrial accidents, that the workers’ compensation statute (Chapter 152) refers to throughout. Source: G.L. c. 23E, § 1

Duty to carry workers’ compensation

Every Massachusetts employer must provide for paying workers’ compensation, by insurance, by joining a self-insurance group, or by being licensed to self-insure. Source: G.L. c. 152, § 25A

Employee (workers’ compensation)

Every person in the service of another under any contract of hire, written or oral, with exceptions the statute lists. Source: G.L. c. 152, § 1

Exclusive remedy

An employee is treated as having given up the right to sue the employer at common law for an injury that workers’ compensation covers, unless the employee reserved that right in writing at the time of hire. Source: G.L. c. 152, § 24

First report of injury

The employer’s report of a work injury that keeps an employee from earning full wages for five or more calendar days. It goes to the state, the employee and the insurer within seven calendar days of notice, not counting Sundays and legal holidays. Source: G.L. c. 152, § 6

Hearing (workers’ compensation)

The proceeding held when a conference order is appealed. The decision must issue within twenty-eight days after the hearing ends. Source: G.L. c. 152, § 11

Impartial medical examiner

A doctor chosen from a state roster to examine the employee when a conference order on a medical issue is appealed. The examiner’s report is prima facie evidence of what it states. Source: G.L. c. 152, § 11A

Insurer repayment from a third-party recovery

When a work-injury claim against a third party succeeds, the workers’ compensation insurer is repaid first. If the amount recovered is greater than what the insurer paid, the excess goes to the employee. Source: G.L. c. 152, § 15

Lump sum settlement

An approved agreement that ends some or all of the insurer’s liability for weekly compensation with a single payment. It does not end liability for medical or vocational rehabilitation benefits for the injury. Source: G.L. c. 152, § 48

Mental or emotional injury (workers’ compensation)

A mental or emotional disability counts as a work injury only where the predominant contributing cause is an event or series of events occurring within the employment. Source: G.L. c. 152, § 1

Partial incapacity

Workers’ compensation for an employee who can work but earns less: 60 percent of the difference between the average weekly wage before the injury and what the employee can earn after it, capped at 75 percent of the total-incapacity rate. Source: G.L. c. 152, § 35

Permanent and total incapacity

Workers’ compensation while the incapacity is both permanent and total: two-thirds of the average weekly wage before the injury, between the state minimum and maximum rates. Source: G.L. c. 152, § 34A

Serious and wilful misconduct

If an employee is injured because of the serious and wilful misconduct of the employer, or of a person entrusted with supervising the work, the compensation is doubled. Source: G.L. c. 152, § 28

Specific injury and disfigurement benefits

One-time payments, in addition to other compensation, for the specific losses the statute lists, such as loss of sight, hearing or the use of a limb, and for bodily disfigurement up to a set amount. Source: G.L. c. 152, § 36

Temporary total incapacity

Workers’ compensation for total incapacity for work: 60 percent of the average weekly wage before the injury, up to the state maximum, for no more than 156 weeks. Source: G.L. c. 152, § 34

Third-party claim (work injury)

A claim against someone other than the employer who is legally liable for a work injury. The employee can receive workers’ compensation and also sue that other person. The law does not bar suits against anyone other than the insured employer and its employees. Source: G.L. c. 152, § 15

Workers’ compensation

The Massachusetts system, under Chapter 152, that pays benefits to an employee who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment. The insurer or self-insured employer pays the compensation. Source: G.L. c. 152, § 26

Workers’ compensation claim deadline

A claim for workers’ compensation must be filed within four years from when the employee first became aware of the connection between the disability and the job. Source: G.L. c. 152, § 41

Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund

A state fund that pays benefits on approved claims against employers who are uninsured in violation of the law, among other payments. Source: G.L. c. 152, § 65

Medical care

The extra steps and limits that apply to claims against health care providers.

Apology statements

Statements, gestures or conduct by a health care provider expressing sympathy, regret, apology, or even mistake or error, about an unanticipated outcome are generally not admissible as evidence in court. Source: G.L. c. 233, § 79L

Collateral source reduction (malpractice)

In malpractice cases against health care providers, the court hears evidence of expenses already paid by other sources, such as insurance, and reduces the award by the amounts it finds were replaced or compensated. Source: G.L. c. 231, § 60G

A physician’s duty to disclose, in a reasonable manner, the significant medical information that is material to a patient’s decision whether to undergo a procedure. Information is material if a reasonable person in the patient’s position would attach significance to it in deciding. Source: Harnish v. Children’s Hospital Medical Center, 387 Mass. 152 (1982)

Limit on pain and suffering (malpractice)

In malpractice cases against health care providers, a jury may not award more than a set amount for pain and suffering and other general damages unless it finds substantial or permanent loss or impairment of a bodily function, substantial disfigurement, or other special circumstances. Source: G.L. c. 231, § 60H

Medical malpractice tribunal

A three-member panel that hears every malpractice case against a health care provider: a Superior Court justice, a licensed physician and a lawyer. It decides whether the evidence, if properly substantiated, raises a legitimate question of liability or is merely an unfortunate medical result. Source: G.L. c. 231, § 60B

Notice of intent to sue (182-day notice)

Before suing a health care provider, a person must give the provider written notice 182 days before filing, with exceptions the statute sets. The notice must describe, among other things, the standard of care claimed and how its breach caused the injury. Source: G.L. c. 231, § 60L

Provider of health care

For malpractice law, a person or institution licensed by the Commonwealth to provide health care or professional services as a physician, hospital, clinic, nursing home, dentist, nurse or another listed profession. Source: G.L. c. 231, § 60B

Standard of care (medical)

The measure of a doctor’s conduct in a malpractice case: the care and skill of the average qualified practitioner, taking into account advances in the profession. Massachusetts does not judge doctors only against others in similar communities (the old “locality” rule). Source: Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102 (1968)

Tribunal bond

If the tribunal finds for the provider, the patient may continue the case only by filing a bond in a set amount. Source: G.L. c. 231, § 60B

Death and family claims

Claims after a death, and claims family members may have of their own.

Bystander emotional distress

A parent who suffers substantial physical harm from severe distress over harm to their minor child caused by someone’s negligence may have a claim, where the parent saw the accident or came on the scene soon after while the child was still there. Source: Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555 (1978)

Conscious suffering

In a wrongful death case, damages may also be recovered for the conscious suffering of the person who died, resulting from the same injury. That money is held by the executor or administrator as assets of the estate. Source: G.L. c. 229, § 6

Death from a defective way

A separate statute for deaths caused by a defect, lack of repair or lack of a sufficient railing on a road, causeway or bridge. Recovery is limited to a set amount, and the action must be started within two years after the injury. Source: G.L. c. 229, § 1

Executor or administrator

In a wrongful death case, only the executor or administrator of the deceased person brings the suit. Damages for the deceased person’s conscious suffering are held by the executor or administrator as assets of the estate. Source: G.L. c. 229, § 2; G.L. c. 229, § 6

Fair monetary value of the decedent

The main measure of wrongful death damages: the value of the person who died to those entitled to the recovery, including lost expected net income, services, protection, care, assistance, society, companionship, comfort, guidance, counsel and advice. Source: G.L. c. 229, § 2

Loss of consortium (parent of an injured child)

Parents of a minor child, or of an adult child dependent on them for support, may sue for loss of the child’s consortium when the child has been seriously injured. Source: G.L. c. 231, § 85X

Loss of consortium (spouse)

A claim by a husband or wife for the loss of a spouse’s society, companionship and assistance caused by another person’s negligent injury to the spouse. Either spouse may bring it. Source: Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153 (1973)

Negligent infliction of emotional distress

A claim for emotional harm caused by someone’s negligence. The injured person must prove negligence, emotional distress, causation, physical harm shown by objective symptoms, and that a reasonable person would have suffered emotional distress in the circumstances. Source: Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540 (1982)

Persons entitled (who receives death damages)

The statute’s order for dividing death damages. A surviving spouse with no children takes all; the shares change when there are children; if there is no surviving spouse, the next of kin take. Source: G.L. c. 229, § 1

Punitive damages (wrongful death)

In a wrongful death case, the statute allows punitive damages, in at least a minimum amount it sets, where the death was caused by malicious, wilful, wanton or reckless conduct or by gross negligence. Source: G.L. c. 229, § 2

Survival of actions

Claims that survive by statute, in addition to those that survive at common law. They include tort actions for assault, battery, imprisonment or other damage to the person. Source: G.L. c. 228, § 1

Wrongful death

A claim against a person who, by negligence or by a wilful, wanton or reckless act, causes the death of someone who could have recovered for the injuries had they lived. The term appears in the statute’s title. Source: G.L. c. 229, § 2

Wrongful death deadline

A wrongful death action must be started within three years from the date of death, or within three years from when the executor or administrator knew, or should have known, the facts giving rise to the claim. Source: G.L. c. 229, § 2

Money, courts and the lawsuit

Damages, interest, liens, consumer protection, and the stages of a court case.

Answer

The defendant’s responsive pleading to the complaint, generally due within 20 days after service unless the court orders otherwise. Source: Mass. R. Civ. P. 12

Arbitration

A process in which a neutral person decides the dispute, in a binding or non-binding decision, after hearing arguments and reviewing evidence. Source: S.J.C. Rule 1:18, Uniform Rules on Dispute Resolution, Rule 2

Case tracks (Superior Court time standards)

Every civil case in Superior Court is assigned to one of three tracks (fast, average or accelerated) that set deadlines for each stage, counted from the date the complaint was filed. Source: Superior Court Standing Order 1-88

Chapter 93A (unfair or deceptive practices)

The Massachusetts consumer protection law. It declares unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or commerce unlawful. People engaged in trade or commerce sue under section 11; others sue under section 9. Source: G.L. c. 93A, § 2; G.L. c. 93A, § 9; G.L. c. 93A, § 11

Collateral source rule

The general rule that a defendant ordinarily may not show the injured person received compensation from other sources, such as an accident insurance policy, workers’ compensation or an employer, because that income does not lawfully reduce the damages. Medical malpractice cases have a separate statute (see “Collateral source reduction”). Source: Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass. 1 (1985)

Complaint

The document that starts a lawsuit. A civil action is commenced by filing (or mailing to the clerk, or electronically submitting) a complaint with the entry fee. The complaint contains a short and plain statement of the claim and a demand for judgment. Source: Mass. R. Civ. P. 3; Mass. R. Civ. P. 8(a)

Contingent fee

A lawyer’s fee that depends on the outcome of the case. In Massachusetts a contingent fee agreement must be in writing and signed by both the lawyer and the client. Source: Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5(c) (S.J.C. Rule 3:07)

Deposition

Questioning of a witness or a party by oral questions, as part of discovery. A witness’s attendance can be compelled by subpoena. Source: Mass. R. Civ. P. 30(a)

Discovery

The ways parties to a lawsuit obtain information from each other: depositions, written interrogatories, production of documents and things, physical and mental examinations, and requests for admission. It reaches any matter, not privileged, relevant to the subject of the case. Source: Mass. R. Civ. P. 26

Hospital lien

A hospital’s claim on the money an injured person receives from a judgment or settlement, for its reasonable and necessary charges, limited to the rate charged in a ward. An attorney’s lien comes first. Source: G.L. c. 111, § 70A

Interrogatories

Written questions one party serves on another, to be answered in writing. A party may serve no more than thirty as of right. Source: Mass. R. Civ. P. 33(a)

Judgment

The trial court’s act that finally decides the rights of the parties. Source: Mass. R. Civ. P. 54(a)

Jury trial

The right to have a jury decide the facts, preserved by Article 15 of Part 1 of the Massachusetts Constitution. A party must demand it in writing no later than 10 days after the last pleading on the issue; failing to demand it waives it. Source: Mass. R. Civ. P. 38

Mediation

A voluntary, confidential process in which a neutral person helps the parties discuss the issues, explore solutions and reach a settlement they both accept. Source: S.J.C. Rule 1:18, Uniform Rules on Dispute Resolution, Rule 2

Medical assistance repayment

When the state’s medical assistance program has paid for care, the injured person must repay those benefits from the part of any settlement or award allocated to medical expenses, and the state has a lien to secure repayment. The person must notify the state’s Executive Office of Health and Human Services in writing within 10 calendar days of beginning recovery activity, such as making a claim or filing suit. Source: G.L. c. 118E, § 22

Motion to dismiss

A motion raising one of the defenses the rules allow a defendant to make by motion rather than in the answer, including failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Source: Mass. R. Civ. P. 12

Multiple damages (Chapter 93A)

Under Chapter 93A a court awards actual damages and may award two or three times that amount if it finds the violation was wilful or knowing, along with reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. Source: G.L. c. 93A, § 9; G.L. c. 93A, § 11

Post-judgment interest

Interest on a money judgment from the day it is entered, at the same annual rate as the prejudgment interest in the award. Source: G.L. c. 235, § 8

Prejudgment interest

Interest the court clerk adds to damages for personal injury or property damage, at 12 percent a year from the date the lawsuit was started. Source: G.L. c. 231, § 6B

Request for production of documents

A written request that the other side produce documents, electronically stored information or other things in its possession, custody or control, so they can be inspected or copied. Source: Mass. R. Civ. P. 34(a)

Rule 35 examination

A physical or mental examination of a party by a licensed or certified examiner, ordered by the court on motion for good cause when the party’s condition is in controversy. The rule does not call it an “independent medical examination.” Source: Mass. R. Civ. P. 35(a)

Spoliation of evidence

The destruction or loss of evidence relevant to a case. A court may impose sanctions and remedies for it, and the duty to preserve evidence can arise before a lawsuit starts, once a party knows or reasonably should know the evidence might matter to a possible claim. Judges have broad discretion in choosing the sanction. Source: Keene v. Brigham & Women’s Hospital, Inc., 439 Mass. 223 (2003)

Summary judgment

A judgment granted on motion when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits show no genuine issue as to any material fact and one side is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It may be granted on liability alone even if the amount of damages is disputed. Source: Mass. R. Civ. P. 56

Summons; service of process

The court paper served on a defendant together with a copy of the complaint. When the action starts, the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s lawyer delivers both to a sheriff, deputy sheriff or another authorized person for service. Source: Mass. R. Civ. P. 4

Superior Court and District Court

Two trial courts that hear injury cases, divided by the likely recovery: a case may proceed in Superior Court only if there is no reasonable likelihood the recovery will be at or below a set amount, and in District Court or the Boston Municipal Court only if it is not likely to exceed that amount. The statute lets the Supreme Judicial Court change the amount by order, and the Legislature’s pages for both sections note a 2019 standing order that raised it. Where multiple damages are allowed, single damages control. Source: G.L. c. 212, § 3; G.L. c. 218, § 19

Reading these definitions with care

A definition is a summary. The statute, rule or decision itself controls, and most contain conditions and exceptions not repeated here.
Laws change. Each link goes to the current official page, which may differ from the text read on October 26, 2026.
Court decisions apply the law to particular facts; later decisions can narrow or extend them.
Dollar amounts are left out on purpose. Several have been changed by later laws or court orders.
Whether any rule applies to a particular injury depends on the facts.

Terms are a starting point

Knowing the words helps in reading a letter from an insurer, a court notice or a news story about a case. It does not answer how the law applies to one injury. That depends on what happened, where, who was involved, and which deadlines and notices apply.

For the filing deadlines and notice rules in more detail, see Massachusetts injury claim deadlines and notice requirements. For how long a case can take once it is filed, see How long a Massachusetts civil case takes.

On this page

How the glossary was made
All terms, A to Z
Fault and responsibility
Deadlines and notice
Government, roads and charities
Cars, bicycles and rideshare
Property and premises
Dogs and products
Injuries at work
Medical care
Death and family claims
Money, courts and the lawsuit
Limits
A starting point

Citing this page

Larson Law Boston, “Massachusetts Injury Law Glossary,” published October 26, 2026. Law as shown on the official sources on October 26, 2026.

The definitions on this page may be reproduced with attribution and a link to this page. Press and research inquiries: marketing@dlarsonlaw.com

Sources

If you were hurt and have questions

These pages explain what the public record shows. They are not advice about a specific situation, and what applies to a particular case depends on its facts. If something here raises a question about your own circumstances, you are welcome to get in touch.